University of South Florida

Digital Commons @ University of South Florida
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

September 2021

Public Budgeting as Moral Dilemma
Ben Wroblewski
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Accounting Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Wroblewski, Ben, "Public Budgeting as Moral Dilemma" (2021). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9267

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Digital Commons @
University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Public Budgeting as a Moral Dilemma

by

Ben Wroblewski

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Business Administration
Muma College of Business
University of South Florida

Co-Major Professor: Dejun (Tony) Kong, Ph.D.
Co-Major Professor: Doug Hughes, Ph.D.
Robert Hammond, DBA
Tianxia (Tina) Yang, Ph.D.
Andrew Artis, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
August 31, 2021

Keywords: Budgetary Slack, Moral Utility Theory, Ethics, Decision-Making
Copyright © 2021, Ben Wroblewski

DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Megan O'Connell, who has infinite patience with
her evolving husband.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thank you to my dissertation committee, which has helped me through the process.
Thank you to my co-chairs Dr. Tony Kong and Dr. Doug Hughes, for your direction and
guidance. I would also like to thank Professors Rob Hammond, Andrew Artis, and Tina Yang for
their insight and perspective. A special thanks go to David Howard. David has been a fantastic
mentor and has been working weekly on learning statistics, model building, scale development,
and the academic landscape.
My colleagues in the 'Group of Five:' I would like to thank Jay Civitillo, Darin Grimm,
Chad Jones, and Dan Kaufmann. I want to thank the University of South Florida DBA executive
team of Grandon Gill, Matt Mullarkey, Michele Walpole, and Lauren Baumgartner.
A special thank you goes to Dr. Michael Schwandt, Dr. Anna Hickey, and my amazing
colleagues at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy Department of Management. Without their
mentorship, support, and encouragement, I would not have achieved this goal.
Thank you to my 2021 DBA cohort members who have made this experience about so
much more than working toward the doctorate. I want to thank Ruben Cintron, John Couris, Sue
Goodman, Marcus Green, Andy Hafer, Darwin Hale, Randall McNair, Chana Mpafe, Fadi Naser
Eddin, Mark Raney, Abilio Santos, Jim Wallace, and Calvin Williams.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ v
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................... vi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
Background of Researcher .................................................................................................. 1
Motivation ........................................................................................................................... 1
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process ............................................. 3
Private Sector Budget Process ............................................................................................ 4
Public Sector Employee Motivations.................................................................................. 5
General Pressure Model (GPM).......................................................................................... 6
Research Question ............................................................................................................ 10
Expected Contributions ..................................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER TWO: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES.................................................................... 12
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 12
Budgetary Slack ................................................................................................................ 12
Social Pressure .................................................................................................................. 13
Social Pressure for Budgetary Slack ................................................................................. 13
Moral Utility Theory ......................................................................................................... 14
Tension and Anxiety ......................................................................................................... 17
Self-Focus (SF) ................................................................................................................. 18
Self-Benefit Judgment ...................................................................................................... 19
Factors Other Than Social Pressure for Budgetary Slack ................................................. 20
Budgetary Slack – Ethics Issue ......................................................................................... 21
Budgetary Slack in the Public Organization Environment ............................................... 22
Proposed Model ................................................................................................................ 23
Hypothesis Development .................................................................................................. 23
Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 23
Hypothesis 1.......................................................................................................... 24
Hypothesis 2.......................................................................................................... 25
Hypothesis 3.......................................................................................................... 25
Hypothesis 4.......................................................................................................... 25
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 27
Participants ........................................................................................................................ 27
i

Experimental Procedure .................................................................................................... 27
Measures ........................................................................................................................... 28
Social Pressure Manipulation ........................................................................................... 28
Manipulation Check Question .............................................................................. 29
Key Variables Scales ........................................................................................................ 29
Tension Scale ........................................................................................................ 29
Self-Benefit Judgement Scale ............................................................................... 29
Approval Intent Scale ........................................................................................... 30
Approval Decision ................................................................................................ 30
Scales for Other Measures ................................................................................................ 30
Affective Organizational Commitment................................................................. 30
Professional Commitment ..................................................................................... 30
Big Five Personality Traits ................................................................................... 31
Moral Disengagement ........................................................................................... 31
Experimental Vignette Method (EVM) ............................................................................ 31
Ethics Scale ....................................................................................................................... 33
Realism Scale .................................................................................................................... 33
Analytic Approach ............................................................................................................ 33
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS ..................................................................................................... 34
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 34
Preliminary Analyses ........................................................................................................ 34
Hypothesis Testing............................................................................................................ 38
Key Results – Robustness Checks .................................................................................... 41
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ............................................................ 43
Key Findings ..................................................................................................................... 44
Other Findings .................................................................................................................. 45
Discussion of Findings ...................................................................................................... 46
Practical Implications............................................................................................ 46
Contribution to Practice .................................................................................................... 48
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research .................................................. 49
Study Limitations .................................................................................................. 49
Future Research .................................................................................................... 50
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 51
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................. 55
Appendix A: Hypothesis 1 SPSS Output .......................................................................... 56
Appendix B: Hypothesis 2 SPSS Output .......................................................................... 57
Appendix C: Hypothesis 2 SPSS Output .......................................................................... 59
Appendix D: Hypothesis 3 and 4 SPSS Output ................................................................ 62
Appendix E: IRB Approval .............................................................................................. 66
Appendix F: Survey .......................................................................................................... 67

ii

iii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Key Variable Descriptive Statistics and Correlations .................................................... 37
Table 2. Regression Analysis Summary for Variables Predicting Tension ................................. 38
Table 3. Regression Analysis Summary for Variables Predicting Approval Intent..................... 39
Table 4. Results of Robustness Checks ........................................................................................ 41

iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. General Model of Pressure Adopted from DeZoort and Lord (1997). ............................ 7
Figure 2. Model of Obedience Pressure Effects on Judgment or Decision Making (JDM). .......... 7
Figure 3. Illustration of Proposed Behavior. ................................................................................... 9
Figure 4. Proposed Model of Pressure. ......................................................................................... 10
Figure 5. Partial MUT model ........................................................................................................ 14
Figure 6. Histogram of Tension .................................................................................................... 35
Figure 7. Histogram of Self-Benefit Judgment ............................................................................. 35
Figure 8. Histogram of Approval Intent ....................................................................................... 36
Figure 9. Histogram of Approval Decision................................................................................... 37
Figure 10. Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Approval Decision............................. 39
Figure 11. Interaction Effect Plot on Approval Intent .................................................................. 40

v

ABSTRACT

Government budget managers are responsible for the proper stewardship of public funds
and facilitating the business transactions necessary to meet the public’s needs. Sometimes,
during these decisions, managers can experience pressure to make an unethical decision. A better
understanding of this issue can help organizations prevent misallocation of funds and adverse
effects within the community. The problem is that the general pressure model lacks a framework
to explain the decision-making process. Moral utility theory can provide insight into how people
weigh or score choices with ethical considerations. This study found that government budget
managers included their self-interests when experiencing tension under pressure. Consequently,
self-interest had a significant relationship with how likely they were to approve a questionable
request. These findings advance research on budgetary slack, moral utility theory, and practical
implications for observing potentially sub-optimal budgeting behavior.

vi

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Background of Researcher
The investigator has served in financial management for six years. He is a Certified
Government Financial Manager (CGFM) sponsored by the American Government Accountants
and a Certified Managerial Accountant sponsored by the Institute of Management Accountants.
The investigator was responsible for 95% of a federal agency’s funds for Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Information Technology, totaling over $700 million. The U.S.
Coast Guard has over 50,000 members and is responsible for coastal defense, search and rescue,
maritime law enforcement, and uniformed services.

Motivation
Government agencies use publicly supplied funds to provide vital services to their
citizens. Research suggests that budgetary slack is typical in organizations (Buchheit et al.,
2003). Dunk and Nouri (1998) defines budgetary slack as the intentional underestimation of
projected revenue or overestimating projected expenses for a task to become easier to achieve or
as a deliberate underestimation of resources needed to meet a more accessible achieved standard
(Douglas & Wier, 2000). For example, if a project only requires $100,000 of funding to
complete a project but $120,000 of funding is requested, this is an example of the overestimation
of resources. From a public organizational perspective, budgetary slack can be beneficial as a
buffer against uncertainty regarding the achievement of preset targets. However, from a private
1

organizational perspective, budgetary slack has several negative implications, including reduced
managerial effort, misallocation of an organization’s resources, and distorted performance
evaluations of managers and their areas of responsibility (Davis et al., 2006).
Budgetary slack causes an unequal flow of resources throughout the organization,
wasting resources at one end while starving another division at the other. This “fluff” ties up an
organization’s resources unnecessarily until late in the fiscal year when each federal department
maximizes spending. The federal government fiscal year ends on September 30th of each year.
Often surplus resources are “hidden” from the financial manager until after the most significant
obligations have occurred. As a result, on September 1st each year, financial managers are
looking for opportunities to exhaust remaining funds.
One difficulty in predicting budgetary slack in the public sector is the lack of
understanding of the motivations of those responsible for these decisions. These motivations can
be from an external impetus like pressure or result from an individual’s psychological
characteristics. There is a difference between the motivation of those working in the public
sector and their private-sector counterparts. Public organizations collect revenue from the
communities they serve through taxes and fees. Those responsible for approving budget requests
are paid through tax revenue, so the public has a vested interest in how the funds are allocated.
This study provides some insight into these motivations and how they influence the creation of
budgetary slack. Specifically, what happens when a budget manager feels tension when facing an
unethical decision. The purpose of public organizations is to maximize the collective good of the
community. Yet, creating budgetary slack does not maximize the collective good because funds
are allocated unequally, which contradicts the purpose of the organization.
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To provide context, the public budgeting process compared with the more common
business process is discussed followed by the individual motivation differences between the two
sectors. Next, current models related to external and internal pressures and influences are
evaluated. Lastly, the proposed model is explained.

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process
A brief discussion of the budgeting process used by the government agencies is necessary
to understand the differences in perception of slack and the different motivations between private
and public sector employees. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process
(PPBE) consists of four interrelated phases: planning, programming, budgeting, and execution.
These phases are conducted sequentially by different levels of the government. The planning
phase begins three years in advance and focuses on identifying the capabilities required to meet
taxpayers’ needs. This phase leverages and defines policies, strategies, and resource needs. The
second phase, programming, allocates resources to support the mission. This phase begins two
years in advance and calculates costs for the next six years to meet mission requirements. The
intent is to prevent short-term decision-making from impacting long-term objectives.
Approximately one year in advance, each service budgets out its conditions to prepare the
President’s Budget compiled by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (McGarry et al.,
2018). Next is the budgeting phase. This is when agencies are most susceptible to budgetary
slack. Each agency has local methods of delivering and negotiating budgets with its respective
parent department and with OMB. When Congress allocates funding authority to each echelon to
spend in the fiscal year, the final phase is execution. Government spending segments into two
categories: mandatory and discretionary. Discretionary funding is limited to approximately 30%
of total funding in a fiscal year (USAspending.gov). The execution phase of the PPBE process is
3

the most inflexible because funds have already allocated to the agencies (McGarry et al., 2018).
The method to request additional funds from Congress or re-direct funds from other parts of the
federal government is arduous and time-consuming.

Private Sector Budget Process
The private sector approaches budgeting differently than does the government. The focus
for a private sector company is a budget that consists of sales revenue, production costs, and
operating expenses. Government budgets are planned on the collection of tax revenue which is a
regulated process often constrained by legal statutes whereas a sales revenue budget provides the
boundaries for the company’s expenses. Governments are constrained by tax revenue collections
but have some flexibility to borrow funds or raise additional taxes.
When developing expense budgets, a few factors that firms consider are new products,
customers, geographical areas, changes due to competition, changes in costs, inflation, and new
strategies in providing the company’s services. Governments must consider the needs of their
community and prioritize those goals in an open forum process. The operating expense budget
follows the sales revenue budget for service firms because there are no manufacturing costs to
consider. The operating expense budget captures the costs necessary to meet sale goals for
salaries, supplies, insurance, which is similar to government budgeting. Firms use their operating
expense budget to plan future capital expenditures and acquire cash to pay off liabilities. Private
sector firms can plan from anywhere to 1-5 years based on the strategy, but there is no required
duration. Government plans vary with the level of authority: federal, state, county, and
municipal. Private sector firms can adjust their budget for increasing revenues and have the
flexibility to leverage market opportunities as they arise without a burdensome request process
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(Braun & Tietz, 2020). Government budgeting focuses on costs necessary to provide services,
while private sector budgeting focuses on revenue necessary to cover costs and generate profits.

Public Sector Employee Motivations
Anecdotally, there are many reasons for a difference in public and private sector
accounting decisions. Evidence suggests that government accountants are more motivated to act
in the public interest instead of individual goals (Donaldson, 1991). Private sector accountants
are motivated by financial and non-financial measures to meet organizational goals, including
profit and loss, solvency, and employee turnover measures that will allow the company to
continue to operate. Private sector managerial accountants have different degrees of pressure
because the human resource structure is different. Often, supervisors of accountants in the
private sector evaluate their direct subordinates based on-budget performance. Similar criteria
are not necessarily valid in government budgeting. The supervisor still evaluates their
employees, but because the promotion system is structured, budget performance is not tied to
either promotion or cash bonuses. The bonuses are often not significant enough to warrant
influence over decision-making. Government is responsible for meeting the needs of its citizens
and, as such, does not always seek the most efficient use of resources nor aims to reduce costs.
These requirements change the motivation of each government member, including financial
managers.
Public sector motivation (PSM) is a general commitment and loyalty towards the public
interest, compassion with people in need of social assistance, self-sacrifice, and attraction to
public policymaking to help improve public services (Perry, 1996). Kjeldzen and Hansen (2018)
found evidence that PSM is positively associated with job satisfaction for public sector
employees. Public administration and public managers have been misjudged by the public they
5

serve and labeled with terms like maladministration or “Bureaupathologies.” Some of the traits
people associate with public administration behavior have included: inert, ineffective, wasteful,
suboptimal, failing to learn (Caiden, 1991). Hur (2017) found that public sector managers
displayed a lower affinity for advancement, training, career development, and increased
responsibility related to job satisfaction. He also found the public sector employees are
extrinsically motivated and not interested in working independently from a structured
supervisory chain. Public sector employees are less likely to experience tension because they are
extrinsically motivated and are not concerned about advancement (Hur, 2017). They may be less
concerned with responding to pressure from a supervisor.

General Pressure Model (GPM)
This study focuses on how social pressure affects the level of tension or stress which
influences decision making. The general pressure model (GPM) measures how social pressure
affects the level of stress which influences decision-making, so it is the logical place to begin the
investigation. GPM is the primary model to predict budgetary slack in the extant literature and
links psychology with behavioral accounting (Davis et al., 2006; DeZoort & Lord, 1997). The
original adoption of the model was from the organizational stress literature (DeZoort & Lord,
1997). DeZoort and Lord (1997) defines the different parts of the model. In Figure 1, Pressure
Stimulus (x) is the characteristic or combination of characteristics that influence individuals.
These can act as potential antecedents to strain responses and outcomes. Stress response
(y) focuses on how professionals perceive pressure. It is the interaction between stimuli and
individual characteristics. Strain outcomes (z) refer to the consequences of the triggers and
response.
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Figure 1. General Model of Pressure Adopted from DeZoort and Lord (1997).
Davis et al. (2006) extended this model into managerial accounting by assigning an
element of social pressure (obedience) as the stimulus and four different individual
characteristics as control variables: professional commitment, impression management,
perceived pressure strength, and perceived decision difficulty (See Figure 2). Davis et al. (2006)
argued that slack could exist if the organizational culture pressured budget managers to create it.

Figure 2. Model of Obedience Pressure Effects on Judgment or Decision Making (JDM).
The GPM focuses on individual differences like professional commitment and impression
management. However, other issue-related factors may provide a better explanation about how
7

individuals engage in unethical decisions. The GPM measures the scope of the behavior based on
a person’s psychological make-up instead of the decision-making process. People experience
tension when put under pressure by a supervisor to approve a request that challenges their ethical
values. The Davis et al. (2006) model assumed the person under stress would shift the
responsibility of the decision to the supervisor abdicating all responsibility for resulting
consequences. This assumption implies the person conducted some manner of calculation, but
the proposed theory of attribution does not explain how that calculation or decision process
occurs. Moral utility theory (MUT) explains how budget managers make deliberate calculations
when making an ethical decision. This study found that budget managers use self-interest in their
calculation of the utility (“value or satisfaction that an individual receives from an event”; Hirsh
et al., 2018, p.45) of each alternative before deciding. Budget managers used their self-interest,
or self-benefit judgment, to resolve the conflict. Cropanzano et al. (2005) defined self-interested
action as “undertaken for the sole purpose of achieving a personal benefit or benefits” (p.985).
The probability of a manager approving a conflicting budget request was directly related
to their level of self-interest. The use of self-benefit judgment to make an ethical decision aligns
with moral utility theory. An illustration of this process is displayed in Figure 3.
Self-benefit judgment acts as a “switch” on a railway junction. The switch which
typically controls which railroad the train runs on controls the budget manager’s decision process
when they conflict or experience tension. Each track represents a different decision available to
the budget manager. Social pressure represents the external force moving the decision down the
track. The conflict is represented by tension just before the switch. Extant literature and
comments from the participants in this study substantiate the assertion that introducing slack into
a budget request is unethical.
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Figure 3. Illustration of Proposed Behavior.
It is unethical to create budgetary slack in governmental accounting. Davis et al. (2006)
supported the assertion that creating budgetary slack was unethical in private sector accounting.
Budget managers recognize that there are ethical considerations when deciding to approve a
request that would create slack. Here are just a few responses from governmental accountants in
this study that reinforce this assertation: “It would be unethical to approve an amount that has
excess”, “…not aligned with what top leadership wants, borderline unethical”, and “Personal
ethics trump this unethical request, [I] cannot work for someone who knowingly lies.”
In the current study, respondents are asked if they believed approving the request in the
scenario was unethical on a seven-point scale. Findings indicate that budget managers agreed
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that approving a request in the scenario that creates slack is unethical (M = 4.69, SD = 1.68). The
methodology is available in Chapter 3.

Research Question
This study was developed to assess the following research question: In public sector
accounting, to what extent does self-interest moderate the relationship between social pressure,
tension, and the propensity of financial managers to create budgetary slack? This study also
evaluated to what extent employees’ self-interest affect an ethical decision when tension was
experienced. This study used the MUT framework, which provides a more comprehensive
understanding of this phenomenon by introducing the idea that each decision the manager can
make has a utility (“value or satisfaction that an individual receives from an event”; Hirsh et al.,
2018, p.45) that is intentionally calculated. The proposed alternative pressure model used MUT
and demonstrates the relationship between perceived tension and intent during the ethical
decision process (See Figure 4).

Figure 4. Proposed Model of Pressure.
Quantitative analysis of 77 government budget managers’ survey responses revealed that
managers inspect their self-interest when making potentially ethical decisions during the budget
process. Regression analysis revealed that if a budget manager perceives tension after being
10

directed to make a questionable decision, that tension forces them to look to their self-interest
and deliberately calculate the moral utility of the decision.

Expected Contributions
A better understanding of this issue can help government employees and organizations
manage budgetary slack. The current research examines how external pressure affects the tension
perceived by the managers and how that affects the manager’s intent to create budgetary slack.
The study makes two main contributions. First, the study identifies MUT as a novel framework
for understanding the ethical decision-making of a public sector employee under social pressure.
Second, it delineates the self-interested nature of a public-sector budget managers’ creation of
budgetary slack upon request. Third, it confirms that budget managers in the public sector
consider the creation of budgetary slack as unethical. The findings identify practical steps
organizations can take to observe and minimize negative effects from self-interest and the
creation of budgetary slack.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Overview
This chapter reviews the primary theories related to budgetary slack and the various
variables associated with the phenomena. Next, social pressure as an antecedent to budgetary
slack is discussed. Then, the difference in the psychological process between public and private
sector accounting and how these differences affect professionals in each. We will introduce
MUT and self-focus related to the proposed model and define each variable associated with the
model. Finally, the current models related to the phenomena of budgetary slack are discussed.

Budgetary Slack
There are some contradictions in the private sector research regarding theory and
antecedents. The extent literature has a litany of research of budgetary slack in a private sector
context (Dunk & Nouri 1998; Hartmann & Maas, 2010; Hobson et al., 2011). However, there is
limited literature on budgetary slack in the public sector, which did not reveal strong similarities
to private-sector research. This literature has produced some common characteristics in
environments where budgetary slack could exist, but it is not all-encompassing. One such
example is Dunk and Nouri (1998), who found an environment where information asymmetry
could create budget slack. One of the primary variables studied in behavioral accounting was
pressure because it inhibits objectivity and forces managers into making unethical decisions.
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Social Pressure
Social pressure is defined as the process of people actively encouraging, urging, or
pressuring someone to act or think in a certain way, by using direct forms of influence, such as
demands and threats, or by giving promises of rewards or social approval (Bastiaensens et al.,
2016). It segments into three categories: compliance, obedience, and conformity (DeZoort &
Lord, 1997). Compliance pressure is defined as when the subject responds to explicit requests at
any level. Obedience is when pressure comes from an authority figure. Conformity refers to an
individual responding to peers (Hartmann & Maas, 2010).

Social Pressure for Budgetary Slack
Davis et al. (2006) found that social pressure had a significant impact on budget decisionmaking. Management accountants can be susceptible to even weak forms of pressure from
authority and create bias in the budget despite policy to prevent occurrences. An example of that
weak form of pressure is when managers respond to pressure from a hypothetical scenario with
no consequences. The managers in the Davis et al. (2006) study created bias and attributed their
actions to their superiors absolving themselves of responsibility. Hartmann & Maas (2010)
attributed budget bias to three factors: involvement in management, social pressure, and
individual personality characteristics. They found that subordinates with a high Machiavellian
rating were more likely to produce slack than those with a low rating. Social pressure is known
to inhibit auditors’ objectivity and threaten an accountant’s fiduciary duties, specifically in a
conservative fiscal environment like government (Brink et al., 2018; Eskenazi et al., 2016).
Social pressure toward obedience could be a significant factor in government accounting with a
rigid hierarchal structure and strict fiscal policies. This study will focus on social pressure felt by
budget managers. Social pressure (compliance) has influenced other budget decisions, such as
13

inventory valuation (Bishop et al., 2013). Compliance is defined as pressure from explicit
pressure from the supervisor, peer, or subordinate and a subset of social pressure (DeZoort &
Lord, 1997). There is reason to believe that pressure will influence other financial decisionmaking. Thus, MUT can be the link between a person under pressure and the likelihood of
unethical behavior.

Moral Utility Theory
MUT is the critical theory behind the proposed model. MUT is a framework for
understanding what a person’s motivation is when making ethical or moral decisions. The brain
estimates the utility of “potential actions based on predicted effects on current goals” (Hirsh et
al., 2018, p. 44). The metric of measurement is subjective expected utility (SEU), calculating
probability and potential outcome. Hirsh et al. (2018) explained that making an ethical decision
would assign weight to each alternative and then choose the option that maximizes SEU even if
it is unmoral or unethical. People were either realistically or deliberately calculating the utility of
their decision-making (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Partial MUT model
Moreover, MUT describes a process to remove “moral uncertainty” (Hirsh et al., 2018)
instead of discussing what went wrong after the decision. Moral uncertainty could exist in at
least three situations. The first is an unfamiliar situation with no benchmark to compare. The
14

second is when there is a conflict between maximizing achievement with social harmony. An
example relevant to government accounting is the conflict between meeting the organization’s
budget goals and the role of management control of the budgeting process. The third situation of
moral uncertainty is when a person cannot see all the potential outcomes leading to an
unforeseen negative consequence.
Previous models include rationalist, sentimentalist, or dual process. Rationalist models
are “based on explicit reasoning about moral principles” (Hirst et al., 2018, p. 45). These models
were criticized for being cognitive and minimized emotions. Sentimentalist models “emphasize
the importance of emotional intuitions” (Hirsh et al., 2018, p. 45). These models are criticized for
reducing cognitive function. Then there are dual-process models which marry the two
approaches together. The model proposed in this study is an example of a System 2 approach.
System 1 is the reactive, emotional process cycle designed for “automatic processing, implicit
learning, and intuition.” System 2 is the conscious reasoning process cycle which “involves
logical analysis, perspective-taking, and the adoption of behavior rules” (Hirsh et al., 2018, p.
45).
MUT begins with personal goals. A budget manager has a personal interest in a budget
request estimating the SEU of approving, disapproving, or some other action. Let us assume a
binary choice, and it involves approving a request more than the needed amount, which is
morally and ethically questionable. The person would calculate the probability of detection or
interest from oversight and any sanction that may occur. It is unusual in government for
accounting professionals to be sanctioned over budget decisions unless they violate federal or
state law.

15

The only obstacle to making the decision will be the anticipated guilt built on their value
system if there is no fear of detection or punishment. Punishment could be the result of
disobeying a direction from a superior. This direct order from the superior results in tension
which will be included in the utility of outcome construct and influence the SEU calculation.
They may also factor in personal relationships in the decision process. For example, suppose the
budget manager embeds (works in another organization outside their formal evaluation structure)
into another organization. In that case, they may seek acceptance even outside their line of
supervision, even if the decision is unethical. They want to assist in achieving organizational
goals, which may temporarily have a higher SEU than the ethical course of action. Social
pressure could be from someone at any level of authority. The budget manager may be
influenced by either peers or by authority figures even outside their organization hierarchy. The
path from their personal goal to an unethical decision could be a simple one.
Hirsh et al. (2018) also points out these SEUs update through reinforced learning. This is
the “conscious reasoning” process, where people use a deliberate process to make decisions. This
deliberate process involves “logical analysis, perspective-taking, and adoption of behavioral
rules” (Hirsh et al., 2018, p. 45). Accounting professionals are trained to use a calculative
method to conduct analysis and make decisions. MUT provides a goal-oriented process when
objectives can be achieved through either an ethical or unethical means. A deliberate process
does not necessarily mean the accountant will choose the ethical action, only that they will
choose the action with the highest expected utility. Accountants may choose to approve a budget
request that creates slack if they believe they can more easily attain their goals. Surveillance
systems are also essential to regulate ethical conduct. More experienced accounting professionals
can make these decisions faster with less stress if previous ethical and unethical actions have
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gone unnoticed. One factor that can influence the expected utility of a decision is the
introduction of pressure into the scenario.
Pressure can cause a person to look inward to seek the decision that satisfies individual
self-interest. This could be one of the factors included in the deliberate calculation of SEU. Selffocus attention (SF) could explain how a manager’s self-interest could influence ethical decisionmaking. Self-interest is the conditional factor in the decision-making process, much like a
railroad switch. A more thorough discussion of self-benefit judgment and tension follows in the
subsequent sections.

Tension and Anxiety
The definition for this study for tension is the psychological state of discomfort due to
conflicting cognitions and feelings (Karremans et al., 2003). Anxiety is associated with a
negative effect of that pressure. Anxiety is a common symptom of tension reported by people,
and the most common negative symptom associated with anxiety is depression (Almeshari et al.,
2021). Krishnaswamy et al. (2019) noted that children experience increased tension and anxiety
when their parents’ pressure them about their academic performance. The children were unable
to cope with parental pressure, which created an adverse environment. Muchacka-Cymerman
(2018) found that teachers experienced an adverse environment under constant pressure from the
students and parents, which increased anxiety and tension leading to professional burnout. When
people experience tension in an adverse environment, they may look inward and examine if the
behavior is in their self-interest. Next is a discussion about how a person may appraise tension
based on self-interest.
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Self-Focus (SF)
Self-focus (SF) is “an awareness of self-referent internally generated information that
stands in contrast to an awareness of externally generated information derived through sensory
receptors” (Mor & Winquist, 2002, p. 638). SF can become self-absorption, a more dysfunctional
form of SF if the person’s attention to self is excessive and unable to shift to an external focus,
when necessary. A complex relationship between the variables is more likely than a single
unidirectional relationship between SF and anxiety. Mor and Winquist (2002) argued that the
relationship between SF and negative affect (NA) is cyclical instead of unidirectional as
causality can describe contexts when SF leads to NA or NA leads to SF. SF is examined in an
experimental design but focusing on the relationship between temporary SF and adverse effects,
as this study provides.
The influence of SF can vary in duration and severity based on gender, age, and
predisposition to NA. SF can be attributable to significant events in a person’s life, such as losing
a loved one or job loss. In those instances, the result is NA. Threats can cause a person to SF and
increase the level of anxiety. Mor and Winquist (2002) found associations between anxiety
conditions like panic and test anxiety with SF, but the relationship was not always present.
However, the relationship could also be valid between positive events and a positive affect like
new jobs or the birth of a child. There is little evidence that a positive event will appraise SF into
NA (Mor & Winquist, 2002).
Evidence suggests that public SF (the standard observed in an environment) is associated
with anxiety. Wegner and Giuliano (1980) supported the assertation. Their research found that an
increase in anxiety and nervousness would induce “self-focused” attention but test what
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pronouns the participant selected under various stress lessons. People tended to choose firstperson pronouns as their heart rate increased.
SF can explain why budget managers chose to include their self-interest as a part of the
SEU. Karremans et al. (2003) argued that interpersonal conflict with negative associations
induced high tension levels and reduced psychological well-being. These conflicts caused a
subordinate to focus inward after repeated offenses. The superior ordering a subordinate to do
something unethical is an excellent example of interpersonal conflict with a negative association
that generates anxiety and increases tension. Anxiety is the emotion commonly associated with
tension, a few examples of negative effects. People are motivated to protect their interests. The
tension and pressure could cause the person to have strong SF and weigh their self-interests in
the decision process using either system one or system two or a combination of the two to
calculate the SEU associated with each alternative. In this experimental design, they have the
choice to either approve or disapprove the budget request. SP will produce tension. Then, using
the MUT framework, the manager’s self-interest will moderate the person’s approval intent and
increases or decreases the probability of a decision to engage in unethical behavior.

Self-Benefit Judgment
Cropanzano et al. (2005) defined self-interested action as “undertaken for the sole
purpose of achieving a personal benefit or benefits” (p.985). This definition of self-benefit
judgment is used for this study. Self-Interest acted as an outcome of SF because people evaluate
their decisions based on comparing the environment. Once SF had triggered by an outside
stimulus like social pressure, the person weighed the decision based on cost-benefit analysis and
then acted. If the self-interested action scores higher than other options, that will be the outcome.
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Factors Other Than Social Pressure for Budgetary Slack
The survey tested other factors based on the extant literature. Most of the literature
surrounding budgetary slack antecedents is from private sector examinations. Church (2012)
found that subordinates and supervisors with shared interests were more likely to self-justify
slack creation than when there are no shared interests. Kramer and Hartmann (2014) observed
that budgets planned by top management are less susceptible to slack creation behaviors than
those planned by employees. Chong and Strauss (2017) argued that managers would avoid slack
creation with information asymmetry and high budget emphasis. Milani (1975) found budgetary
participation to be a factor that increases budget slack, mainly when formal rewards were linked
to budget execution (Brownell & McInnes, 1986). Budget managers have negotiated for more
funds than what was required when they participate.
Dunk and Nouri (1998) contends that individual motivation is an underresearched topic
area. The need for achievement was to do something essential to exceed a standard (Atkinson,
1977). He argued that low achievement individuals tended to make decisions in groups and
created slack because of the participation factor. Individuals also controlled scarce resources and
fulfilled a need for power, suggesting that even organizational departments or divisions that do
not require a more significant portion of funding could still receive it due to their power status
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). Altenburger (2017) argued that managers would engage in slack
creation behaviors because of peer pressure. Government hierarchy, with senior officers arguing
for resources beyond their requirement, could be particularly troublesome. Individuals with the
need for autonomy may resist rules and only perform duties that satisfy their self-interest,
leading to slack creation if they are under pressure.
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The extant literature found that organizational commitment is an inhibitor of budgetary
slack. Taylor and Curtis (2010) found that individuals with high organizational commitment
were more likely to minimize unethical behavior in their organizations. Organizational
commitment also mitigates the effects of social pressure (obedience and conformity) on ethical
decision-making (Clayton & van Staden, 2015; Tsunogaya et al., 2017). High organizational
commitment has also reduced budgetary slack (Aprila & Hidayani, 2012). Next is an evaluation
of whether public budget managers feel slack creation is an ethical question.

Budgetary Slack – Ethics Issue
There are conflicting opinions if budgetary slack is an ethical decision or a business
decision. Douglas and Wier (2000) surveyed professional management managers and found the
individual ethics predicted slack creation behavior. They argued that managers recognize slack
creation behavior as unethical but lack the will or a compelling reason to stop. Daumoser & Sohn
(2018) found that ethics knowledge did not dissuade slack creation behavior. Recent literature
reviews on the topic indicate a lack of contributions from an ethical perspective in the field, and
that direct survey questionnaires were losing importance (Daumoser, 2018). Davis (2006)
specifically asked the respondents about the ethical culture within the organization before
presenting the participant the vignette. Davis et al. (2006) asked this question to ascertain if the
respondents felt the creation of slack was unethical. Eighty-Six percent of respondents felt that it
was wrong to “pad the budget.”
There have been previous findings discussed above that budget slack is a positive development
in government. Some budget managers who took the survey look at this type of budget decision
as a business decision. Some of the qualitative comments from government budget managers
who completed this survey are as follows: “High profile program with significant importance.
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OK, to ensure a buffer even though the program has never spent to its budgeted levels. Leftover
funds could be used for end-of-year sweep up” and “The actual underspending is immaterial to
the total size of the budget of 1.2M. I do not see a moral/ethical dilemma by building a small
slack in this scenario to guard against uncertainty. Given no other information, I would approve
the budget with the caveat we adjust and report mid-year any changes.” These managers do not
see a need to examine the ethical considerations in this situation. However, other budget
managers used this opportunity to act as good stewards of public funds. An example of a
government budget managers qualitative comments is: “I think it is important to be realistic
about the true cost of any initiative. While project managers often tout coming in “under
budget,” that means that sources that could have been utilized elsewhere were trapped in a
program that didn’t need them. It’s wasteful. It’s inefficient.”
Most people in my study believed the creation of slack would violate their ethics and is
considered cheating behavior. Next, let us discuss how slack creation would manifest itself in a
public sector environment.

Budgetary Slack in the Public Organization Environment
There is a lack of extant literature about the budgetary slack phenomena in the public
sector because it is challenging to measure slack creation in the public sector. Most government
services do not have suitable private substitutes for similar services, so comparisons are rare, and
the goals of each part of the organization vary (Busch, 2002). Few private companies are willing
to provide a service generally provided by governments because of cost or scope. Thus, slack is
used in the public sector to provide additional inducements for customers despite the lack of
substitutes and a reserve for future investment (Busch 2002; Busch & Gustafsson, 2002). Laing
(2008) found that leadership styles could affect whether middle managers created slack.
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Bradbury and Scott (2018) argued that many municipal government organizations had little
incentive to control costs, so budgetary slack is likely. Most of the accounting literature has
labeled slack as a suboptimal outcome. Still, a small group of literature observes positive aspects,
such as adapting to emerging conditions and strategic changes (Davila & Wouters, 2005), which
adds to the complexity of the ethical question.

Proposed Model
The proposed decision-making model (see Figure 4) uses self-benefit judgment as a
moderator between tension and approval intent. The budget manager will use their self-interest to
decide if they will support the budget request. The comptroller directs the subordinate to approve
the ethically questionable request. The subordinate feels the tension associated with the pressure
from the comptroller. However, the subordinate weighs the personal benefits against the
consequences of the action before making the decision. The model predicts that if the person has
a low self-interest in approving the request, they are less likely to do so. If the subordinate has a
high self-interest in approving the request, they are more likely to do so.

Hypothesis Development
Using MUT as a theoretical framework, it is hypothesized that there is a link between
these psychological pressures and the decisions made by public sector employees. Specifically,
self-interest will moderate the effect of social pressure-induced tension on budgetary slack
creation.

Hypotheses
Social pressure has been shown to have a statistically significant correlation with an
increase in stress in previous research (Brink, 2018; Davis et al., 2006). Pressure acts as the
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stimulus that creates a stressor like anxiety or tension. Pressure increases individuals’ perceived
stress which results in a shift in responsibility to an authority figure. Davis et al. (2006)
hypothesized that obedience pressure would cause budget managers to feel an increase in stress
levels and an unethical outcome. Accordingly, social pressure is hypothesized to be positively
related to tension.

Hypothesis 1
Social pressure (compliance) has a positive effect on tension. DeZoort and Lord (1997)
defined their pressure construct as a single or combination of individual characteristics that affect
cognitive processes. Social pressure is antecedent to stress response and psychological strain
outcomes. Wegner & Guiliano (1980) argued that people under pressure would experience
tension and examine their self-interest like the self-benefit judgment construct, which could be
positive or negative. Davis et al. (2006) found a direct positive correlation between social
pressure and an increased propensity to create budgetary slack. The conflict of the scenario in the
study creates tension. Tension results in subordinates inwardly asking themselves about the selfbenefit of approving the decision. Self-interest creates a conditional effect between perceived
tension and the likelihood that a budget manager will create budgetary slack. When self-benefit
is high, the tension that results from social pressure induces an employee to create slack; but
when self-benefit is low, that same tension induces the employee to not create slack.
Accordingly, the relationship between tension and the participant’s approval intent depends on
the level of self-benefit judgment.
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Hypothesis 2
Self-benefit judgment moderates the indirect effect of social pressure on approval intent
mediated by tension, such that tension triggered by social pressure will positively affect approval
intent when self-benefit judgment is high but a negative effect on approval intent when selfbenefit judgment is low.
The theory of reasoned action (TRA) stated that people’s intentions predict their
behavior. The theory of planned behavior is an extension of TRA to predict behavior in a
specific situation or across situations. Intentions included all the individual psychological
motivations that influenced behavior (Ajzen, 1991, p. 182). These theories suggest that behaviors
under a person’s control are preceded by intentions to engage in that behavior. Accordingly,
there will be a direct positive correlation between approval intent and approval.

Hypothesis 3
The approval intent to create budgetary slack predicts the approval decision. People who
are self-interested appraise their decisions to ascertain if making the decision is in their own best
interests before taking action. Pressure causes people to focus inward. For example, if it is in the
budget manager’s best interest to not, the outcome is positive. If there is a conflict between the
two interests, the outcome could be harmful. Combining the logic from Hypotheses 1 to 3,
Hypothesis 4 proposes the following moderated serial-mediation hypothesis to test the entire
model.

Hypothesis 4
Self-benefit judgment moderates the indirect effect of social pressure on approval
decision. Furthermore, it is thought that self-benefit judgement sequentially mediates tension and
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approval decision, such that tension triggered by social pressure will have a positive effect on
approval intent and decision when self-benefit judgment is high but a negative effect on approval
intent and decision when self-benefit judgment is low.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY

Participants
The study surveyed 77 government accountants from federal, state, and municipal
agencies and organizations. On average, participants were 50-60 years of age (SD = .96). About
70% of participants were federal employees, 29% were municipal employees, and 1% worked
for a state agency. Fifty-three percent worked at the headquarters level, and all participants
worked for an average of 16.13 years (SD=9.65) within their organization and 13.09 years (SD =
8.05) on average in finance. Respondents did not receive any compensation for their
participation.

Experimental Procedure
The survey was segmented into three parts. The first part collected demographic
information such as age, gender, and tenure. This survey section also measured the Big 5
personality traits, professional commitment, and moral disengagement using existing collection
instruments. The second part of the survey introduced the experimental task and follow-on
questions to measure if the participants understood the task correctly. Finally, the third part of
the survey measured organizational commitment, ethics, and how realistic the experiment task
was.
Part two of the survey was an experimental task (provided in Appendix F) that immersed
a governmental budget manager into a potential ethical scenario that involved a budget request.
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The participants assumed the role of a budget manager who reviews requests and makes
recommendations to the comptroller. The budget manager is responsible for enforcing fiscal
policy in the organization. Each experimental task manipulates different levels of social pressure
from the comptroller. The scenario explained to participants that a specific request exceeds
historical spending, and the manager must decide to allocate the amount requested or deny the
request.

Measures
The key variables were social pressure, tension, self-benefit judgment, approval intent,
and the approval decision. The study used these variables for robustness: extroversion,
imagination, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and moral disagreement.
Professional commitment and organizational commitment were measured as covariates. Data
were collected for two months.

Social Pressure Manipulation
This variable was measured by the manipulation in the scenario. For example, in one
scenario, the comptroller directed the budget manager to approve the request using the language:
Despite the new budget policy, I want you to approve the full $1.2 million budget
request. We need to protect the project against allocation cuts and to ensure the same
amount of funding is available next year. Budgeting anything less than last year's budget
would significantly increase the chance of us coming in over budget, putting the project
at risk, and reflecting poorly on us.
This language represented the high level of social pressure in the scenario. In the low
social pressure scenario, the comptroller asked the budget manager to decide using the language:
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In light of the new budget policy, I leave it to you to approve as much of the $1.2 million
budget request as you feel is appropriate. We would like to protect the project against
allocation cuts and to ensure the same amount of funding is available next year.
Budgeting anything less than last year's budget would significantly increase the chance of
coming in over budget, putting the project at risk and reflecting poorly on us. However,
the decision is yours to make.”

Manipulation Check Question
Participants were asked, “Based on what the comptroller told me at the end of the
meeting (in this scenario), to what extent did the comptroller provide pressure to create an
inflated budget request. Participants responded to the question on a seven-point scale (1 = none
at all; 7 = a great deal).

Key Variables Scales

Tension Scale
Tension was measured with the question, “How much tension are you feeling after being
asked to conform to the request from the comptroller in this scenario?” Participants responded to
the question on a seven-point scale (1 = far too little; 7 = far too much).

Self-Benefit Judgement Scale
Self-benefit judgment was measured with the question, “To what extent do you perceive
conforming to the request of creating budgetary slack as beneficial to yourself in this scenario?”
Participants responded to the question on a seven-point scale (1 = far too little; 7 = far too much).
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Approval Intent Scale
Participants were asked, “Based on the information presented and the fact that you report
directly to the comptroller in this scenario, how likely are you to approve this budget request?”
Participants indicated their approval intent on a seven-point scale (1 = extremely unlikely; 7 =
extremely likely).

Approval Decision
Each participant was asked to indicate their final decision after reading the vignette
(Yes/No).

Scales for Other Measures
The following measures were used for robustness checks.

Affective Organizational Commitment
Affective organization commitment was assessed using a six-item scale (α = .82)
(Eisenberger et al., 2010). Participants indicated how they feel about their current organization.
We defined an organization as the government agency they work for. Participants rated the items
on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).

Professional Commitment
Professional Commitment (PC) was measured using a six-item scale previously used to
measure professional commitment (α = .40) within two federal agencies: US Fish and Wildlife
and US Geological Services (Lauber, 2020). Participants rated the items on a seven-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
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Big Five Personality Traits
The first part of the survey measured the Big Five factors of personality using the 20-item
Mini-IPIP scale (Donnellan et al., 2006). The mini-IPIP is a scaled-down version of the 50-item
International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999) and is proven to produce similar results.
The categories include extroversion (α = .77), agreeableness (α = .80), conscientiousness (α =
.66), neuroticism (α = .68) and openness (α = .02). The score of each trait was the mean of the
four responses (including two reverse-scored items) for each trait. All the measures are listed in
Appendix F.

Moral Disengagement
Moral disengagement taps the likelihood that people will morally disengage and conduct
unethical behavior without negatively affecting their self-image or sense of self-worth
(Ungvarsky, 2019). Moral disengagement is segmented into eight categories: Moral justification,
euphemistic labeling, good comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of
responsibility, distortion of consequences, dehumanization, and attribution of blame. Moral
disengagement was measured using an eight-item scale (Moore et al., 2012). The scale assesses a
single response for each of the eight antecedents (α = .79). Participants rated the eight items on a
seven-point scale. Participants rated the items on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 =
strongly agree).

Experimental Vignette Method (EVM)
EVM is “a way to address the dilemma of conducting experimental research that results
in high levels of confidence regarding internal validity but threats to external validity…whose
conclusions are ambiguous on causal relationships.” (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014, p. 351). The
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authors define a vignette as “a short, carefully constructed description of a person, object or
situation, representing a systematic combination of characteristics.” Aguinis and Bradley (2014)
identified two types of EVM: paper people study and policy capturing/conjoint analysis. Paper
people studies are when participants make explicit decisions or judgments in ethics studies. The
authors point out six decision points when planning EVM.
The first point is to determine if EVM is suitable for the study. The authors point out that
EVM is helpful for students who “exercise control of independent variables to gather evidence of
causation” and are associated with ethical dilemmas (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). The second
decision point is choosing the type of EVM. Paper people studies are helpful because they
concentrate on explicit instead of implicit responses from the participants. The vignette will
especially ask the respondent to respond, and the analysis will focus only on the direct impact on
the dependent variable. The third decision point is choosing the type of research design.
Between-person designs require only one vignette in literature because the researcher cannot
measure variation in the participant's response. A within-person design provides each person the
same set of scenarios to measure the variation in the judgments of a single person. A mixed
design allows the researcher to provide different sets of vignettes by the group. This study will
use the mixed approach with the vignettes assigned randomly among respondents.
The next decision is to choose the level of immersion. The more realistic the vignette, the
more generalizable the results. The immersion of this study will be limited to a written scenario
which will provide the necessary information for a budget manager to make a decision. There are
two main approaches—orthogonal, which allows the researcher to see independent effects of
each factor or an approach that overlays the variables, which may be more realistic and
generalizable. The last decision point for planning is the number of vignettes. Aguinis and
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Bradley (2014) did not recommend a minimum number for paper people studies. This study will
present a single scenario to each participant.

Ethics Scale
The survey asked the participant about the perceived ethicality of the request using the
two-item scale (α = .67) (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). These questions ask respondents, “To
what extent do you feel like cheating if you conform to the request from the comptroller in this
scenario?” and “To what extent do you feel like violating your professional ethics if you conform
to the request from the comptroller in this scenario?” This scale uses a seven-point scale (1 = far
too little; 7 = far too much).

Realism Scale
Realism was measured on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
with the following statements (α = .90): “Realistically, I might encounter a situation like the one
described in the scenario”; “At some point during my career, I am likely to encounter a situation
like the one described in the scenario”; and “An encounter similar to the one described in the
scenario is likely to happen to me.” The scale tapped how realistic the respondent felt the
situation in the scenario was. The measure was adapted from Farh et al. (2017).

Analytic Approach
I performed regression analyses coupled with PROCESS macro script (Hayes, 2018) to
test the relationships among the constructs of interest, particularly social pressure, tension, and
approval intent. I conducted a two-tailed t-test to examine whether the pressure manipulation in
the scenario was successful. PROCESS generated a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for
each indirect effect.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS

Overview
A total of 126 people responded to the survey as part of a Qualtrics panel. Seventy-seven
people completed the survey and passed the attention checks. There were significant positive
correlations among social pressure, tension, and approval intent. The relationship between
tension and approval intent was conditional based on high or low levels of self-benefit judgment.
The results also revealed no significant correlation in the model with any of the tested
organizational or professional commitment variables.

Preliminary Analyses
The distribution of tension responses and self-benefit judgment are presented in Figures 6
and 7, respectively. The responses for approval intent were skewed positively as more
participants were less likely to approve the request (see Figure 8). Participants for the approval
decisions were also skewed positively as 74% of the participants disapproved the budget request
(see Figure 9).
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Figure 6. Histogram of Tension

Figure 7. Histogram of Self-Benefit Judgment
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The breakdown by sex for those who approved the budget request were 45% men (n=x),
55% women (n= 20), and for those who disapproved of the request was 65% were men and 35%
were women. Results indicated that the scenario was realistic (M = 5.45, SD = 1.50) and that
participants believed this scenario presented an ethical decision (M = 4.70, SD = 1.60). The key
variable correlations are included in Table 1.

Figure 8. Histogram of Approval Intent
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Figure 9. Histogram of Approval Decision

Table 1. Key Variable Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable
1
Approval Intent

M
3.14

SD
1.74

1

2

3

2

Tension

4.55

1.23

0.05

3

Self-Benefit

4.05

1.61

0.14

0.18

4

Compliance Pressure 1.55
(2=High,1=Low)

0.5

0.21

.25*

-0.07

5

Level of GOVT

1.58

0.91

-0.15 0.06

-0.09

6

Gender

1.63

0.49

-0.07 0.00

-0.01

7

Age

3.12

0.96

-0.20 -0.10 0.08 -0.16

8

Status

1.84

0.86

-0.14 0.07

0.02 -.48** .29**

9

Agency Tenure

16.1

9.65

-0.17 0.06

0.16 0.13 .32** -.32**

10

Position Tenure

13.1

8.05

-0.21 -0.05 0.12 -.25* .5**

11

GVT and Pos Tenure 13.1

8.66

-.31** -0.18 0.09 .39** -0.12 .59**

Note. N = 77. *p<.05; **p<.01 (two tailed)
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5

6

7

.51**

8

9

10

0.04
.46** 0.12 .73**

11

Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1 states that social pressure would increase tension. PROCESS-aided
regression analysis examined the effect of social pressure on self-reported tension. Social
pressure had a significant positive relationship with tension (b = .60, SE = .27, p = .032) (see
Appendix A for exact output). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported (see Table 2).

Table 2. Regression Analysis Summary for Variables Predicting Tension
Variable
Social
Pressure

B
0.60

SE
0.28

95% CI
[.085, 1.142]

β
0.25

t
0.03

p
0.03

F (1,75)
4.76

Hypothesis 2 states that self-benefit judgment moderates the indirect effect of social
pressure on approval intent mediated by tension, such that tension triggered by social pressure
will positively affect approval intent when self-benefit judgment is high but a negative effect on
approval intent when self-benefit judgment is low. Using PROCESS (Model 14), I found that
tension does interact with self-benefit judgment to predict approval intent at both the high (+1
SD) level (effect = .51, SE = .24, p = .036) and the low (-1 SD) level of self-benefit judgment
(effect = -.99, se = .34, p = .005). The index of moderated mediation was positive (Index = .24,
BootSE = .14, Boot 95%CI = [.01, .54]) (see Appendix B for the exact output). However, I found
that tension had only a partial indirect effect on the relationship between social pressure and
approval intent. The effect of social pressure on approval intent through tension with high selfinterest judgment is not significant (indirect effect = .33, BootSE = .24, Boot95%CI [-.07,.87])
whereas when self-benefit judgment is low, the indirect effect of social pressure on approval
intent through tension is significant (indirect effect = -.64, BootSE = .39, Boot95%CI [-1.53, .03]) Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported (see Table 3).
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Table 3. Regression Analysis Summary for Variables Predicting Approval Intent
Variable

B

Intercept

SE

95% CI

t

p

F(4, 69)

p

10.47 3.02 [4.46, 16.50]

3.47

0.00

3.66

0.01

Social Pressure

0.48

0.40 [-0.32, 1.28]

1.19

0.24

Tension

-1.73

0.57 [-2.86, -0.60]

0.00

Self-Benefit Judgment

-1.93

0.63 [-3.06, -0.51]

Tension x Self-Benefit
Judgment

0.38

0.12 [0.14, 0.61]

3.06
2.79
3.12

0.01
0.00

Hypothesis 3 states that approval intent has a positive relationship with the approval
decision. Using PROCESS (Model 91) (see Appendix C for the exact output), I found approval
intent has a positive relationship with the approval decision (b = 2.46, SE = .70, p = .001) when
controlling for social pressure, tension, self-benefit judgment, and the interaction between
tension and self-benefit judgment. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Approval Decision
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Hypothesis 4 states that self-benefit judgment moderates the indirect effect of social
pressure on the approval decision mediated serially by tension and approval intent, such that
tension triggered by social pressure will have a positive effect on approval intent and decision
when self-benefit judgment is high but a negative effect on approval intent and decision when
self-benefit judgment is low. Using PROCESS (Model 91) (see Appendix D for the exact
output), self-benefit judgment moderates the entire sequential mediation model (index = .60,
BootSE = 4.34, Boot95%CI [.05, 14.80]). The effect of social pressure on approval intent
through tension is significant at the low level of self-benefit judgment (indirect effect = -1.31,
BootSE = 9.74, Boot95CI [-31.44, -.11]) but not significant at the high level of self-benefit
judgment (indirect effect = .62, BootSE = 5.04, Boot95%CI [-.38, 15.75]). The interaction effect
was plotted and is displayed in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Interaction Effect Plot on Approval Intent
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The slope for low self-benefit judgement indicates is negative, indicating a negative
relationship between tension and approval intent. The slope for high self-benefit judgment is
non-significant, indicating no meaningful relationship between tension and approval intent.
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was partially supported as shown in Figure 11, for which the results
were generated using PROCESS Model 91. *<.05, ** p<.01 (two tailed).

Key Results – Robustness Checks
I conducted analyses with PROCESS (Model 91) with each of the covariate variables
(see Table 4). There were no significant changes between these variables in the main model.
Findings suggest that age was negatively associated approval intent (b = -.43, se = .20, p = .038).
Cheating was positively associated with tension (b = .25, se = .08, p = .004) and negatively
associated with approval intent (b = -.35, se = .13, p = .008).

Table 4. Results of Robustness Checks
Variables

Tension

App Intent

App Decision

B

SE (95%CI)

B

SE (95% CI)

B

SE (95% CI)

Affective
Commitment

0.20

.12[-.04, .45]

-0.10

.17, [-.44, .25]

0.08

.55, [-1.00, 1.17]

Professional
Commitment

0.16

.18, [-.19,.52]

-0.30

.25, [-.80, .19]

0.16

.62, [-1.05, 1.37]

Extroversion

-0.09

.13, [-.34, .16]

0.03

.17, [-.32, .37]

-0.48

.43, [-1.31, .36]

Agreeableness

0.07

.15, [-.22, .37]

-0.19

.15, [-.60, .21]

-0.75

.70, [-2.11, .61]

Conscientiousness

0.19

.14, [-.10, .47]

0

.20, [-.38, .21]

-0.26

.63, [-1.48, .97]

Neuroticism

0.08

.14, [-.20, .36]

0.22

.19, [-.36, .22]

0.96

.65, [-.67, 1.90]

Intelligence

0.12

.20, [-.27, .52]

-0.21

.28, [-.76, .34]

-0.48

.76, [-2.0, 1.00]
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Table 4. (Continued)
Moral
Disengagement

-0.23

.23, [-.69,.24]

0.27

.32, [-.37, .91]

-1.04

1.07, [-3.13, 1.06]

Age

-0.24

.15, [-.53, .06]

-0.43*

.20, [-.84, -.03]

-1.23

.73, [-2.66, .20]

Tenure

-0.03

.02, [-.06, .01]

-0.08

.02, [-.13, .01]

-0.08

.09, [-.26, .10]

Gender

0.05

.30, [-.54, .64]

-0.15

.40, [-.94, .65]

-0.66

1.01, [-2.65, 1.33]

Cheating

0.25*

.08, [.09, .42]

-0.35*

.13, [-.61, -.10]

0.13

.42, [-.70, .96]
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study examined how social pressure influenced budget managers making ethical
decisions in public accounting. The results indicate complex relationships among social pressure,
tension, approval intent, and the approval decision than expected. This study revealed that
individuals are self-interested in making an intentional, morally charged approval decision.
Unlike previous studies, my experimental study revealed no relationship between organizational
or professional commitment and approval intent or the approval decision.
The current study found that participants experienced tension in response to social
pressure, which made them self-focused and used their self-interest judgment to guide their
intentional decision to approve the requested budgetary slack. Notably, when individuals
considered compliance with the requested budgetary slack to be less (vs. more), not selfbeneficial, they are less (vs. more) likely to approve that request. These findings are aligned with
MUT, suggesting that individuals are self-interested in making the morally charged decision to
approve the requested budgetary slack.
This study looked at potential antecedents of budgetary slack in public organizations.
Budgetary slack presents a problem in public budgeting because of the scarcity of resources and
the cumbersome administration. Often, budget managers must decide to support a program at the
expense of another, which could jeopardize future spending requirements.
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Key Findings
This study shows that respondents felt tense in response to the comptroller’s pressure for
approving the requested budgetary slack because there was a moral conflict. In addition, findings
suggest that once the budget manager experienced tension because of the conflict, they
calculated which decision was best for their self-interest. Self-benefit judgment governs how
budget managers react to their experienced tension in making theory intentional approval
decisions; in this sense, self-benefit judgment operates like a railroad junction switch, as
previously mentioned. The switch steers the direction of the intentional decision. If the approval
is not in the budget manager’s self-interest, the budget manager will be associated with a lower
approval intent. However, if the approval is in the budget manager’s self-interest, the budget
manager’s experienced tension does not have a meaningful effect on the approval intent. Thus,
intent was the main predictor of the behavior.
This was an unexpected finding in a government environment. Experience suggests that
budget managers make these decisions objectively, prioritizing requirements through an open
process. However, instead the budget manager includes their interest in the decision-making
process. We would also expect a government budget manager to be less susceptible to pressure
but found an increase in perceived tension when the manager demanded compliance. We also
found that this is a realistic scenario, so many government managers have faced a similar
situation in their careers. This finding is counter to the literature on public service motivation.
This SF would cause people to ask themselves how and to what extent they perceive conforming
to the request of creating budgetary slack as beneficial to themselves. Budget managers evaluate
the utility of each option to choose the alternative with the highest score despite the moral
consequences. This result is consistent with SF and MUT.
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Other Findings
Previous research suggests that a budget manager committed to the organizational goals
may interpret meeting those goals as their moral obligations despite their responsibility to the
public to spend funds per set priorities. Contrary to previous findings, there was no relationship
between organizational or professional commitment and approval intent or the approval decision.
Social pressure may have overpowered organizational commitment in shaping approval intent.
This may be the primary reason why the results were different is mostly in experiment design.
The study targeted government workers and not private-sector workers, which were the sample
in previous studies. The experimental vignette foundations were from Davis et al. (2006) based
on a private sector employee survey, but there was a key difference in the dependent variable.
For this study, participants were asked the likelihood that they would create slack, whereas
previous studies asked participants to assign a dollar value to the budget request. The researcher
would then interpret whether those values were considered budgetary slack. There may be other
factors that could have more influence over the behavior instead of organizational commitment.
Collins (1978) posited that personality traits affected attitudes towards budgeting, and age,
tenure, and organizational status were not correlated.
This study looked at the exploratory variables and intent to create budgetary slack. The
study included the Big 5 traits of agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, imagination,
and extroversion. Conscientiousness is the only trait that previous research supported a
relationship with the creation of budgetary slack. Purti (2013) found evidence that people who
demonstrated a high degree of conscientiousness contribute and make decisions in the budget
process. There was a lack of extant literature between the other four variables and budgetary
slack. This study did not find any meaningful relationship between personality traits and
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budgetary slack. This finding was unexpected because there are examples in previous research of
personality traits impacting decision-making in budgeting. Hartmann (2010) found that
personality traits were mediating the relationship between pressure and budgetary slack creation.
The lack of a similar finding in my study with a small sample size suggests further research is
required.

Discussion of Findings

Practical Implications
These findings beg the question of how government accountants entangle their selfinterest with the budgeting process. There could be several reasons why this phenomenon would
occur. Embedded budget managers may feel a sense of responsibility to approve these requests
in response to pressure and culture at the unit. Budget managers may also choose to engage in
unethical conduct if they perceive a poor evaluation, affecting promotion and cash bonuses,
although those sanctions are unlikely in many government environments. However, some of the
respondents in this study indicated they would approve the request to avoid punishment.
MUT stresses the importance of motivation in the ethical decision-making process and
suggests that motivation alone is not sufficient to avoid unethical actions. Hirsh et al. (2018)
does suggest some practical strategies to fix ethical problems, which can be adapted for budget
managers. The first strategy is to monitor budget managers during periods of “high-stakes
performance”, such as the final month or quarter of the fiscal year. The tone the organization,
sets influences directly how the managers act. Organizations need to be cautious if they define
how much funding to spend by a specific date. They want to avoid budget managers approving
requests with blindness towards proper stewardship of taxpayer funding. Organizations should
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dedicate resources to scrutinize the process or publish job aids to assist their managers in
insufficient staffing or a lack of appropriate accounting information systems.
Another strategy is to integrate ethical principles into the decision-making process to
meet performance goals. Appropriation laws were briefly discussed in the introduction, which
are the primary management control for governmental accountants. However, appropriation law
often applies to higher-level segments and not to the daily project spending limits. Overall,
flexibility is invaluable to an organization to remain nimble at the end of a fiscal year and
respond to emergent needs. Budget managers need to consider both the legal limits and project
requirements. An accountant should not approve a budget request unless it is legal and necessary
to perform the mission.
Another widely employed method by government and professional organizations is to
provide ethics training for their employees. There are often annual ethics training requirements
for federal agencies and for maintaining professional certifications such as the Certified
Government Financial Manager (CGFM) or Certified Defense Financial Manager (CDFM)
designations. Organizations should also emphasize objectivity in these training sessions.
Objectivity training could minimize the conditional effects of self-benefit judgment in these
situations. This training includes appropriate discussions of ethical violations in both public and
private organizations. Some of the recent subjects of these discussions have been the
ENRON/Author Andersen scandal, Waste Management, and WorldCom, to name a few
examples. This training should also include a job aid for budget managers to consider before
making budget approval decisions. An additional part of this strategy is assessing and promoting
ethics-focused personnel evaluation and compensation systems (Hirsh et al., 2018). Ethics are
integrated into the military officer evaluation system under the responsibility assessment. The
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definition of responsibility on the evaluation form is acting ethically, courageously, and
dependably and inspiring the same in others. In this study, over 74% of the budgeting personnel
surveyed did not approve the unethical request, so training has been effective.
In addition, this study provides a framework for ethical decision-making for budget
managers across business and government sectors. MUT can apply to any ethical decisionmaking, which typically has an element of pressure involved. The previous research was based
on pressure and psychological traits that may influence the decision. These results present a new
approach and theoretical perspective about why people make ethical decisions or refrain from
unethical decisions. The study extended slack budget literature to the public sector and extended
pressure literature to integrate self-focus into the decision model. Budget managers may approve
a morally questionable request if doing so supports their self-interest. Tension preceded by
pressure causes this inward focus in collaboration with the MUT. This study extends the
literature on MUT, adding a person’s self-interest into the SEU calculation in the process of
ethical decision-making.

Contribution to Practice
Unlike previous studies, government employees perceive themselves as less willing to
approve these kinds of requests. It is difficult to reconcile the respondents' responses with actual
budget results. A large percentage of government spending occurs towards the end of the fiscal
year, which could mean funds were allocated above requirement levels during the budget
process. Government entities must take care of how they set up the environment and the tone
during budget formulation. Supervisors of budget personnel should also observe if their
personnel account for their self-interest in the budgeting process or any budget request.
Supervisors of embedded employees should observe any affinity between those managers and
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subordinates that would compromise their management control functions. Professional
organizations like the Association of Governmental Accountants and the Institute of
Management Accountants emphasize objectivity in their respective standards of behavior. The
standard is vital to reduce practices like budgetary slack and champion ethical decision-making
as public resource stewards.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

Study Limitations
The survey did not include an equal number of respondents from the different levels of
government, so it was difficult to see if there was a difference between the groups. The number
and specialty of respondents also limited the statistical power among the variables, which
produced small effect sizes. Variables like tension and particularly self-benefit judgment were
based on a single item and not an extensive scale. Any findings of causality between tension,
approval intent, and the approval decision are preliminary. Future researchers should use more
extensive scales to support the construct. Another measurement error may be bias in survey
responses because budget managers want to reflect their ideal self when responding to potential
ethics questions or scenarios (Brenner & DeLamater, 2016). Some elements in the scenario could
be changed to provoke a more vigorous response, such as the budget request amount. Some
participants indicated that the dollar amount requested over the requirement was insufficient to
provoke an unethical decision.
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Future Research
This study supports the future paths of research. Future research should explore the effect
of organizational or group affinity to find other variables that moderate or mediate the
relationship between tension and approval intent. Previous research suggested that organizational
commitment is a vital variable in ethical decision-making. Although this study did not support
prior findings, this issue deserves further examination. This study did not account for group
dynamics or interplay in the decision to approve the request. For example, suppose that the
budget manager has loyalty for a smaller group. The person may approve an otherwise unethical
request to align themselves with personal relationships or group goals.
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Appendix A: Hypothesis 1 SPSS Output

Coefficients
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
3.628
.446
.601
.275
.246

Model
1
(Constant)
Social
Pressure
a. Dependent Variable: tension
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t
8.141
2.181

Sig.
.000
.032

Appendix B: Hypothesis 2 SPSS Output

Run MATRIX procedure:
**************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5.3 ****************
Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.
www.afhayes.com
Documentation available in Hayes (2018). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3
**************************************************************************
Model : 1
Y : Approval Intent
X : Tension
W : Self-Benefit Judgment
Covariates:
Social Pressure
Sample
Size: 74
**************************************************************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
Q5LIKELY
Model Summary
R
R-sq
.4183
.1750

MSE
2.6144

F
df1
df2
p
3.6584 4.0000 69.0000

.0092

Model
coeff
constant
2.2613
Tension
-.2155
Self-Benefit -.0824
Int_1
.3750
Social Press .4781

se
t
.6453 3.5041
.1727 -1.2477
.1459 -.5650
.1201 3.1218
.4010 1.1923

p
LLCI
.0008
.9739
.2164 -.5600
.5739 -.3735
.0026
.1354
.2372 -.3218

Product terms key:
Int_1 :
tension x self-benefit
Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):
R2-chng
F
df1
df2
p
X*W .1165 9.7458 1.0000 69.0000
.0026
---------Focal predict tension
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ULCI
3.5487
.1291
.2087
.6146
1.2780

Mod var: self-benefit judgment (W)
Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):
SBJ
Effect
-1.6124 -.8201
.0000 -.2155
1.6124
.3892

se
t
.2990 -2.7424
.1727 -1.2477
.2127 1.8296

p
LLCI
ULCI
.0078 -1.4167 -.2235
.2164 -.5600
.1291
.0716 -.0352
.8135

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:
Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.
DATA LIST FREE/
tension
SBJ App Intent .
BEGIN DATA.
-1.2296 -1.6124 4.1456
.0000 -1.6124 3.1371
1.2296 -1.6124 2.1287
-1.2296
.0000 3.2692
.0000
.0000 3.0042
1.2296
.0000 2.7393
-1.2296 1.6124 2.3928
.0000 1.6124 2.8713
1.2296 1.6124 3.3498
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
Tension, approval intent, SBJ
*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:
95.0000
W values in conditional tables are the mean and +/- SD from the mean.
NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:
SBJ tension
WARNING: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect output
when some variables in the data file have the same first eight characters. Shorter
variable names are recommended. By using this output, you are accepting all risk
and consequences of interpreting or reporting results that may be incorrect.
------ END MATRIX -----
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Appendix C: Hypothesis 2 SPSS Output
Run MATRIX procedure:
**************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5.3 ****************
Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.
www.afhayes.com
Documentation available in Hayes (2018). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3
**************************************************************************
Model : 14
Y : Approval Intent
X : Social Pressure
M : Tension
W : SBJ
Sample
Size: 74
**************************************************************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
tension
Model Summary
R
R-sq
.2635
.0694

MSE
1.4266

F
df1
df2
p
5.3726 1.0000 72.0000

.0233

Model
coeff
constant
3.5344
Social Press .6475

se
.4558
.2793

t
7.7550
2.3179

p
.0000
.0233

LLCI
2.6258
.0906

ULCI
4.4429
1.2043

**************************************************************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
Approval Intent
Model Summary
R
R-sq
.4183
.1750

MSE
2.6144

F
df1
df2
p
3.6584 4.0000 69.0000

.0092

Model
coeff
constant 10.4765
SP
.4781
tension -1.7357
SBJ
-1.7851

se
3.0171
.4010
.5679
.6395

t
3.4723
1.1923
-3.0564
-2.7914

p
LLCI
ULCI
.0009 4.4575 16.4955
.2372 -.3218 1.2780
.0032 -2.8686 -.6028
.0068 -3.0608 -.5093
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Int_1

.3750

.1201

Product terms key:
Int_1 :
tension x

3.1218

.0026

.1354

.6146

SBJ

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):
R2-chng
F
df1
df2
p
M*W .1165 9.7458 1.0000 69.0000
.0026
---------Focal predict tension
Mod var: SBJ (W)
Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):
SBJ
2.0000
4.0000
6.0000

Effect
-.9857
-.2357
.5142

se
.3447
.1749
.2404

t
-2.8593
-1.3475
2.1390

p
LLCI
ULCI
.0056 -1.6735 -.2980
.1822 -.5848
.1133
.0360
.0346
.9939

****************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y *****************
Direct effect of X on Y
Effect
se
t
.4781
.4010 1.1923

p
.2372

LLCI
-.3218

ULCI
1.2780

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:
INDIRECT EFFECT:
SP
-> tension -> approval intent
SBJ Effect BootSE BootLLCI BootULCI
2.0000 -.6382
.3858 -1.5331 -.0348
4.0000 -.1526
.1678 -.5746
.0695
6.0000
.3329
.2380 -.0655
.8704
Index of moderated mediation:
Index BootSE BootLLCI BootULCI
SBJ
.2428
.1365 .0144
.5404
--*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:
95.0000
Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:
60

5000
W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.
WARNING: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect output
when some variables in the data file have the same first eight characters. Shorter
variable names are recommended. By using this output, you are accepting all risk
and consequences of interpreting or reporting results that may be incorrect.
------ END MATRIX -----
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Appendix D: Hypothesis 3 and 4 SPSS Output
Run MATRIX procedure:
**************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5.3 ****************
Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.
www.afhayes.com
Documentation available in Hayes (2018). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3
**************************************************************************
Model : 91
Y : Approval Decision
X : Social Pressure
M1 : tension
M2 : Approval Intent
W : Self-Benefit Judgment
Sample
Size: 74
**************************************************************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
tension
Model Summary
R
R-sq
.2635
.0694

MSE
1.4266

F
df1
df2
p
5.3726 1.0000 72.0000

.0233

Model
coeff
constant
-1.0062
Social Press .6475

se
.4558
.2793

t
-2.2077
2.3179

p
.0305
.0233

LLCI
ULCI
-1.9147 -.0976
.0906 1.2043

**************************************************************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
Approval Intent
Model Summary
R
R-sq
.4183
.1750

MSE
2.6144

F
df1
df2
p
3.6584 4.0000 69.0000

.0092

Model
coeff
constant 2.2613
Social
.4781
tension -.2155

se
t
.6453 3.5041
.4010 1.1923
.1727 -1.2477

p
.0008
.2372
.2164

LLCI
.9739
-.3218
-.5600
62

ULCI
3.5487
1.2780
.1291

SBJ
Int_1

-.0824
.3750

.1459
.1201

Product terms key:
Int_1 :
tension x

-.5650
3.1218

.5739
.0026

-.3735
.1354

.2087
.6146

SBJ

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):
R2-chng
F
df1
df2
p
M1*W .1165 9.7458 1.0000 69.0000
.0026
---------Focal predict: Q8_1TENS (M1)
Mod var: Q8_4SELF (W)
Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):
SJB
Effect
-1.6124 -.8201
.0000 -.2155
1.6124
.3892

se
t
.2990 -2.7424
.1727 -1.2477
.2127 1.8296

p
LLCI
ULCI
.0078 -1.4167 -.2235
.2164 -.5600
.1291
.0716 -.0352
.8135

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:
Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.
DATA LIST FREE/
Q8_1TENS Q8_4SELF Q5LIKELY .
BEGIN DATA.
-1.2296 -1.6124 4.1456
.0000 -1.6124 3.1371
1.2296 -1.6124 2.1287
-1.2296
.0000 3.2692
.0000
.0000 3.0042
1.2296
.0000 2.7393
-1.2296 1.6124 2.3928
.0000 1.6124 2.8713
1.2296 1.6124 3.3498
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
Q8_1TENS WITH Q5LIKELY BY
Q8_4SELF .
**************************************************************************
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
Approval Decision
Coding of binary Y for logistic regression analysis:
Approval Intent Analysis
.00
.00
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1.00

1.00

Model Summary
-2LL ModelLL
28.3227 55.9836

df
3.0000

p McFadden CoxSnell Nagelkrk
.0000
.6640
.5307
.7805

Model
coeff
se
constant -6.2556 2.1572
SP
-2.9372 1.4014
tension
.7005
Approval Intent 2.4627

Z
p
LLCI
ULCI
-2.8999
.0037 -10.4837 -2.0276
-2.0960 .0361 -5.6838 -.1906
.5570 1.2577
.2085 -.3912 1.7922
.6957 3.5399
.0004 1.0992 3.8263

These results are expressed in a log-odds metric.
****************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y *****************
Direct effect of X on Y
Effect
se
Z
p
LLCI
ULCI
-2.9372 1.4014 -2.0960
.0361 -5.6838 -.1906
Conditional and unconditional indirect effects of X on Y:
INDIRECT EFFECT:
SP
-> tension -> Approval Intent
Effect
.4536

BootSE BootLLCI BootULCI
5.1579 -.7945 10.3501

INDIRECT EFFECT:
Social Pressure -> Approval Intent -> Approval Decision
Effect BootSE BootLLCI BootULCI
1.1773 8.1516 -1.3430 23.2438
INDIRECT EFFECT:
Social Pressure -> tension

-> Approval Intent

SBJ
Effect BootSE
-1.6124 -1.3076 9.7438
.0000 -.3436 3.3630
1.6124
.6205 5.0410

BootLLCI BootULCI
-31.4392 -.1081
-8.2776
.3060
-.3827 15.7513

Index of moderated mediation:
Index BootSE BootLLCI BootULCI
SBJ
.5979
4.3355 .0540
14.7962
64

-> Approval Decision

--*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:
95.0000
Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:
5000
W values in conditional tables are the mean and +/- SD from the mean.
NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:
SBJ tension
NOTE: Direct and indirect effects of X on Y are on a log-odds metric.
WARNING: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect output
when some variables in the data file have the same first eight characters. Shorter
variable names are recommended. By using this output, you are accepting all risk
and consequences of interpreting or reporting results that may be incorrect.
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Appendix E: IRB Approval
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Appendix F: Survey

Start of Block: Informed Consent
Informed Consent to Participate in Research
Title: The perception of decision making in public budgeting
Study #2027
Study Staff: This study is being led by Ben Wroblewski (bwroblewski@usf.edu) who is
a doctoral student at the University of South Florida. This person is called the Principal
Investigator. He is being guided in this research by Dr. Dejun Kong and Dr. Douglas Hughes.
Study Details: The purpose of the study is to find out what external influences and internal traits
guide a government budget manager's decision-making process. This survey should take less
than 20 minutes to complete. Participants: You are being asked to take part because you have
experience and expertise in the area of accounting and budgeting.
Voluntary Participation: Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to participate and may
stop your participation at any time. There will be no penalties or loss of benefits or opportunities
if you do not participate or decide to stop once you start.
Benefits, Compensation, and
Risk: We do not know if you will receive any benefit from your participation. There is no cost to
participate. This research is considered minimal risk.
Confidentiality: Even if we publish the findings from this study, we will keep your study
information private and confidential. Anyone with the authority to look at your records must
keep them confidential.
If you have questions about your rights, complaints, or issues as a person taking part in this
study, call the USF IRB at (813) 974-5638 or contact the IRB by email at RSCH-IRB@usf.edu.
I freely give my consent to take part in this study. I understand that by proceeding with this
survey, I am agreeing to take part in this research, and I am 18 years of age or older. Please
choose "I consent" below to continue.

o I consent (11)
o I do not consent (12)
Skip To: End of Survey If Informed Consent to Participate in Research
decision making in public... = I do not consent
End of Block: Informed Consent
Start of Block: Demographics
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Title: The perception of

GVT Level What level of government do you or did you work for?

o Federal (1)
o State (2)
o Local/Municipal/County (3)
o N/A - Have not worked in Government (4)
o Other - Please specify below (5)
Gatekeeper Question Did you or are you serving in a finance/budget/accounting position?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Federal Level What level of government are you or did you serve in if applicable?

o Headquarters (4)
o Service Center (5)
o Field Unit/Office (6)
o Not Applicable (7)
Agency What federal agency, state agency or municipal organization are you or did you work
for?
________________________________________________________________
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Gender Do you identify as male, female, or other?

o Male (1)
o Female (2)
o Non-binary (3)
o Prefer not to say (4)
Age Please indicate your age range.

o 20-30 (1)
o 30-40 (2)
o 40-50 (3)
o 50-60 (4)
o 60+ (5)
Status Are you or were you a member of the uniformed services or civilian employee if
applicable?

o Uniformed Service Member (1)
o Federal Civilian Employee (2)
o Other (3)
o I worked both in uniform and civilian service (4)
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Agency Tenure How many years have you been with your current agency?
________________________________________________________________

Position Tenure How many years have you served in a budget or finance position?
________________________________________________________________

GVT and Pos Tenure How many years have you served in a budget or finance position within
the government?
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Demographics
Start of Block: Pre-Scenario Questions
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Q1 When thinking of yourself in general, please indicate your level of agreement for the
following statements from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".
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Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
disagree
(3)

Neither
agree
nor
disagree
(4)

Somewhat
agree (5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
agree
(7)

I am the life
of the party.
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I sympathize
with others’
feelings. (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I get chores
done right
away. (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I have
frequent
mood swings.
(4)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I have a vivid
imagination.
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I don’t talk a
lot. (6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I am not
interested in
other
people’s
problems. (7)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I often forget
to put things
back in their
proper place.
(8)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I am relaxed
most of the
time. (9)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I am not
interested in
abstract ideas.
(10)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

72

I talk to a lot
of different
people at
parties. (11)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I feel others’
emotions.
(12)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

I have
difficulty
understanding
abstract ideas.
(15)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I keep in the
background.
(16)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I am not
really
interested in
others. (17)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I make a
mess of
things. (18)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I seldom feel
blue. (19)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I do not have
a good
imagination.
(20)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I like order.
(13)
I get upset
easily. (14)
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Q2 Please indicate your level of agreement for the following statements from "strongly disagree"
to "strongly agree".
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Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
disagree
(3)

Neither
agree
nor
disagree
(4)

Somewhat
agree (5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
agree (7)

I definitely
want to
continue my
career in
this
profession.
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

If I could do
it all over
again, I
would not
choose to
work in this
profession.
(2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

If I had all
the money, I
needed
without
working, I
would
probably
still
continue to
work in this
profession.
(3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I like this
profession
too well to
give it up.
(4)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

This is the
ideal
profession
for my life’s
work. (5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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I am
disappointed
that I ever
entered this
profession.
(6)

o

o

o
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o

o

o

o

Q3 Please indicate your level of agreement for the following statements from "strongly disagree"
to "strongly agree".
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Strongly
Disagree
(8)

Disagree
(9)

Somewhat
disagree
(10)

Neither
agree
nor
disagree
(11)

Somewhat
agree (12)

Agree
(13)

Strongly
agree
(14)

It is okay to
spread
rumors to
defend those
you care
about. (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Taking
something
without the
owner’s
permission
is okay as
long as
you’re just
borrowing
it. (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Considering
the ways
people
grossly
misrepresent
themselves,
it’s hardly a
sin to inflate
your own
credentials a
bit. (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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People
shouldn’t be
held
accountable
for doing
questionable
things when
they were
just doing
what an
authority
figure told
them to do.
(4)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

People can’t
be blamed
for doing
things that
are
technically
wrong when
all their
friends are
doing it too.
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Taking
personal
credit for
ideas that
were not
your own is
no big deal.
(6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Some
people have
to be treated
roughly
because
they lack
feelings that
can be hurt.
(7)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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People who
get
mistreated
have usually
done
something
to bring it
on
themselves.
(8)

o

o

o

80

o

o

o

o

Q4 Please indicate your agreement with the following statements using the following
scale. Note: Organization is defined as the agency you are working for.
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Strongly
disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
disagree
(3)

Neither
agree
nor
disagree
(4)

Somewhat
agree (5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
agree (7)

This
organization
has a great
deal of
personal
meaning for
me. (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I do not feel
"emotionally
attached" to
this
organization.
(2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I do not feel
a strong
sense of
"belonging"
to my
organization.
(3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I feel that I
have too few
options to
consider
leaving this
organization.
(4)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

One of the
few serious
consequences
of leaving
this
organization
would be the
scarcity of
available
alternatives.
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Right now,
staying with
my
organization
is a matter of
necessity as
much as
desire. (6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I think that
people these
days move
from
company to
company too
often. (7)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Jumping
from
organization
to
organization
does not
seem at all
unethical to
me. (8)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

One of the
major
reasons I
continue to
work for this
organization
is that I
believe that
loyalty is
important
and therefore
feel a sense
of moral
obligation to
remain. (9)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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I do not feel
like 'part of
the family' at
my
organization
(10)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

It would be
very hard for
me to leave
my
organization
right now,
even if I
wanted to.
(11)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Things were
better in the
days when
people stayed
with one
organization
for most of
their careers.
(12)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

QX Please select Extremely happy as the answer to this question.

o Extremely unhappy (14)
o Somewhat unhappy (15)
o Neither happy nor unhappy (16)
o Somewhat happy (17)
o Extremely happy (18)
End of Block: Pre-Scenario Questions
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Start of Block: Scenario 1
Experimental Task Budget Request Approval
Please assume you are a budget manager in your level of a government budget approval process.
You report directly to the comptroller, who evaluates your performance and determines your
annual raises and promotions. Your current responsibilities are to provide ad hoc reporting,
analyses, and budget recommendations. Also, you are responsible for enforcing organizationalwide fiscal policies. It is common knowledge in your division that budget estimations reflect
accurate costs from previous years. There is a mentality within the organization to scrutinize
budget requests to properly steward taxpayer funds and preserve the integrity of the budget
process. Meeting budgeted spending goals is considered necessary for two reasons. First, the
chances of additional funding during the fiscal year are low. Second, the division is responsible
for maintaining a service level to the client and ultimately serve the public.
This year there is a budget request for $1.2 million to provide maintenance on a current radio
system. This project has spent an average of 90% of the funds allocated in the last few years and
does not denote on the request the reason for the additional funds. $1.2 million was the amount
appropriated to the project three years ago, and the project team has consistently requested the
full amount despite fund reductions in the total budget base. The project has the support of the
program manager and the client in the maximum amount.
Just after the start of this year’s budgeting process, the budget director called a teleconference to
discuss a new budget policy. During the teleconference, the Budget Director discussed a newly
issued memorandum stating that, because of a recent allocation cut, spending budgets must be as
accurate as possible, and project managers should expect to take a high-risk position with
funding. Specifically, the director stated the budgeted spending levels should represent “a fair
and equitable estimate to meet organizational goals.”
At the end of the meeting, the comptroller pulls you aside and says:
“In light of the new budget policy, I leave it to you to approve as much of the $1.2 million budget
request as you feel is appropriate. We would like to protect the project against allocation cuts
and to ensure the same amount of funding is available next year. Budgeting anything less than
last year’s budget would significantly increase the chance of us coming in over budget, putting
the project at risk, and reflecting poorly on us. However, the decision is yours to make.”
Actual versus Budgeted Spending
Project Spending
2017
2018
2019
Budgeted Spending 1,200,000
1,200,000 1,200,000
Actual Spending
1,068,000
% under (over) budget
11%

1,092,000

1,080,000
9%

End of Block: Scenario 1
Start of Block: Scenario 2
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10%

Experimental Task Budget Request Approval
Please assume you are a budget manager in your level of a government budget approval process.
You report directly to the comptroller, who evaluates your performance and determines your
annual raises and promotions. Your current responsibilities are to provide ad hoc reporting,
analyses, and budget recommendations. Also, you are responsible for enforcing organizationalwide fiscal policies.
It is common knowledge in your division that budget estimations have not changed significantly
from year to year and have routinely exceeded 10 percent of the actual cost. There is a mentality
within the division and in other divisions to ask for additional funds to protect the projects
against allocation cuts and to protect future allocations. Meeting budgeted spending goals is
considered necessary for two reasons. First, the chances of additional funding during the fiscal
year are low. Second, the division is responsible for maintaining a service level to the client and
ultimately serve the public.
This year there is a budget request for $1.2 million to provide maintenance on a current radio
system. This project has an average spend down the rate of 90% of the budget in the last few
years and does not denote on the request the reason for the additional funds. $1.2 million was the
amount appropriated to the project three years ago, and the project team has consistently
requested the full amount despite fund reductions in the total budget base. The project has the
support of the program manager and the client in the maximum amount.
Just after the start of this year’s budgeting process, the budget director called a teleconference to
discuss a new budget policy. During the teleconference, the division officer discussed a newly
issued memorandum from the organization’s director stating that, because of recent allocation
cuts, spending budgets must be as accurate as possible. There will be a risk that emerging issues
cannot be addressed. Specifically, the director’s memorandum stated that the budgeted spending
levels should represent “a fair and equitable estimate to meet organizational goals.”
At the end of the meeting, the comptroller pulls you aside and says:
“Despite the new budget policy, I want you to approve the full $1.2 million budget request. We
need to protect the project against allocation cuts and to ensure the same amount of funding is
available next year. Budgeting anything less than last year’s budget would significantly increase
the chance of us coming in over budget, putting the project at risk, and reflecting poorly on
us.”
Actual versus Budgeted Spending
Project Spending
2017
Budgeted Spending
1,200,000
Actual Spending
1,068,000
% under (over) budget 11%

2018
1,200,000
1,092,000
9%

End of Block: Scenario 2
Start of Block: Post Scenario Questions
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2019
1,200,000
1,080,000
10%

Q5 Based on the information presented, and the fact that you report directly to the comptroller in
this scenario, how likely are you to approve this budget request?

o Extremely unlikely (58)
o Moderately unlikely (59)
o Slightly unlikely (60)
o Neither likely nor unlikely (61)
o Slightly likely (62)
o Moderately likely (63)
o Extremely likely (64)
Q6 What is your decision on this budget request in this scenario?

o Disapprove (1)
o Approve (2)
Q7 What were some important factors for your decision in this scenario? (Please describe your
thoughts in necessary detail.)

Q8 Please answer the following questions regarding the budget recommendation scenario.
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Far
too
little
(1)

Moderately
too little
(2)

Slightly
too little
(3)

Neither
too
much
nor too
little (4)

Slightly
too
much
(5)

Moderately
too much
(6)

Far too
much
(7)

How much
tension are
you feeling
after being
asked to
conform to
the request
from the
comptroller
in this
scenario? (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

How much
stress are you
feeling after
being asked
to conform to
the request
from the
comptroller
in this
scenario? (4)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

To what
extent do you
perceive
conforming
to the request
of creating
budgetary
slack as
beneficial to
the
organization
in this
scenario? (5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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To what
extent do you
perceive
conforming
to the request
of creating
budgetary
slack as
beneficial to
yourself in
this scenario?
(13)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

To what
extent do you
perceive
conforming
to the request
of creating
budgetary
slack as
detrimental
to the
organization
in this
scenario? (6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

To what
extent do you
perceive
conforming
to the request
of creating
budgetary
slack as
detrimental
to yourself in
this scenario?
(9)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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To what
extent do you
feel like
cheating if
you conform
to the request
from the
comptroller
in this
scenario?
(10)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

To what
extent do you
feel like
violating
your
professional
ethics if you
conform to
the request
from the
comptroller
in this
scenario? (7)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

To what
extent do you
feel like
being loyal to
the
organization
if you
conform to
the request
from the
comptroller
in this
scenario? (8)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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To what
extent do you
feel like
being
obedient to
the
organization's
authority if
you conform
to the request
from the
comptroller
in this
scenario?
(11)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

To what
extent do you
feel like
following the
organization's
tradition or
convention if
you conform
to the request
from the
comptroller
in this
scenario?
(12)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Q9 Please answer the following questions regarding the budget recommendation scenario.
Neither
Far
too
Slightly
Moderately Slightly
Moderately Far too
too
much
too
too little
too little
too much
much
little
nor too
much
(26)
(27)
(30)
(31)
(25)
little
(29)
(28)
To what extent
would the
comptroller's
pressure to
create
budgetary
slack
negatively
affect your
confidence in
your judgment
of the
appropriateness
of approving
such a request?
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

To what extent
would the
comptroller's
pressure to
create
budgetary
slack
negatively
affect your
confidence in
your
understanding
of an
appropriate
response to
such a request?
(2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Q10 Based on what the comptroller told me at the end of the meeting (in this scenario), to what
extent did the comptroller provide pressure to create an inflated budget request

o None at all (20)
o A little (21)
o A moderate amount (22)
o A lot (23)
o A great deal (24)

93

Q11 Please indicate your agreement with the following statements using the following
scale. Note: Organization is defined the agency you are working for.
Neither
Strongly
Somewhat
agree
Disagree
Somewhat Agree Strongly
disagree
disagree
nor
(2)
agree (5)
(6)
agree (7)
(1)
(3)
disagree
(4)
The
comptroller is
characteristic
of this
organization.
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

The
comptroller
and this
organization
have a lot in
common. (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

This
comptroller is
representative
of this
organization.
(3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

This
comptroller is
typical of this
organization.
(4)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Q12 Please indicate your agreement with the following statements using the following scale
Neither
Strongly
Somewhat
agree
Disagree
Somewhat Agree Strongly
disagree
disagree
nor
(2)
agree (5)
(6)
agree (7)
(1)
(3)
disagree
(4)
It is realistic
that I might
encounter a
situation
like the one
described in
the scenario.
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

At some
point during
my career, I
am likely to
encounter a
situation
like the one
described in
the scenario.
(2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

An
encounter
similar to
the one
described in
the scenario
is likely to
happen to
me. (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Please write down any comments you might have regarding this survey (if you had difficulty
understanding the questions, any issues related to the content or the format of the study, etc.).
Thank you for your participation.
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